abstract This article reviews three strands in the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR) in Western Europe. It first assesses political opportunity explanations for the fortunes of the PRR. Second, it discusses internal supply-side approaches, referring to leadership, organization and ideological positioning. Third, research on the consequences of the rise of these parties and movements is examined: do they constitute a corrective or threat to democracy? The review concludes with future directions for theorizing and research.
Introduction
One of the key preoccupations of scholars of contemporary politics is the political backlash of social unease about immigration and cultural diversity. In particular, support for populist radical right (PRR) parties and movements has swelled in previous decades, which has triggered extensive political and scholarly debate (Backes and Moreau, 2012 ). Whether we like it or not, many citizens support parties and movements that promote xenophobia, ethno-nationalism and anti-system populism (Rydgren, 2007) .
This review provides an overview and assessment of the scholarship on the PRR in Western European democracies. First, we briefly discuss the definitional debate about what constitutes the PRR family. Second, we review the literature on supply-side explanations for the fortunes of PRR parties and movements. Third, we discuss research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and movements. Do they constitute a corrective or threat to democracy (cf. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012) ? There is now a growing literature that tackles this question in an empirical manner (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015) . The review concludes with a discussion of the future directions that theorizing and research could take.
We narrow our scope to the PRR in contemporary Western European democracies. Nevertheless, the theories, findings and suggestions for future work could also be applicable to comparable cases elsewhere, such as the Tea Party in the United States (Parker and Barreto, 2014; Williamson et al., 2011) and PRR parties and organizations in Eastern Europe (Allen, 2015; Minkenberg, 2015; Pirro, 2015) . Until today a strict labour division seems to divide sociologists from political scientists, with each discipline focusing on the non-electoral and electoral channel, respectively (Rydgren, 2007) . Social movement protests have generally been dominated by 'the left', while 'the right' mainly uses the electoral channel to voice its discontent, instead of taking to the street (Hutter, 2014; Van der Meer et al., 2009) . Consequently, social movement scholars tend to overlook the most important contemporary actors mobilizing against the consequences of globalization and immigration: the populist radical right (Hutter and Kriesi, 2013) . As Caiani et al. (2012: 4) put it: 'while political party studies provide more and increasingly sophisticated analyses of radical right parties, social movement studies ... has been slow to address the "bad side" of social movement activism'. Only when sociologists widen their perspective to the electoral channel, are we able to fully grasp the implications of globalization and large-scale immigration for political contention.
Definitional debate on radical rightwing populism
Different labels such as 'extreme right' (Arzheimer, 2009; Bale, 2003; Lubbers et al., 2002) , 'far right' (Ellinas, 2007; Erk, 2005) and 'populist radical right' (Mudde, 2007) are used interchangeably to refer to the same organizations, such as the French Front National (FN), Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (VB). A consensus has emerged that they constitute one single family. According to Mudde's (2007) influential definition, three features characterize this family: nativism, populism and authoritarianism.
The most important common denominator is their nativist stance. This exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion of citizenship is reflected in the slogan 'own people first' (Betz, 1994; Immerzeel et al., 2016; Rydgren, 2005a) . The label 'radical' refers to the non-centrist, outspoken position at the far end of the political spectrum on issues related to immigration and ethnic diversity (Akkerman et al., 2016) . Since they strongly hold issue-ownership over immigration issues (Abou-Chadi, 2016) some scholars simply refer to the PRR as anti-immigration parties (Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug et al., 2005) .
Second, PRR groups share their populist, antiestablishment rhetoric (Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007; Pelinka, 2013) . Populism is a communication style or 'thin' ideology that divides society into two homogeneous groups: the 'pure people' and the untrustworthy 'corrupt elite' (Akkerman et al., 2013; Canovan, 1999; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2007) .
Third, authoritarianism implies stressing themes like law and order and traditional values. Relatedly, PRR groups favour strong leaders who reflect 'the will of the people' (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) . However, there is no consistent empirical relationship between authoritarianism and PRR party preference (Dunn, 2015) . At least in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, 'new' PRR parties have stressed progressiveness -liberty, women's rights, individualism -against reactionary authoritarian standpoints (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; De Koster et al., 2014; Rydgren, 2005b) . Moreover, the picture painted of social movement activists is at odds with traits such as conformism or submission to traditional authority (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006) It is often stated that radical right populism endangers some of the constitutional foundations of liberal democracies: pluralism and the protection of minorities (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Betz, 2004; Mudde, 2007) . At the same, however, scholars agree that it distinguishes itself from political extremism, in the sense that PRR supporters and activists respect democracy, whereas extremist groups go beyond the limits of the procedures which define the democratic political processes (Betz and Johnson, 2004; Klandermans and Mayer, 2006; Minkenberg, 2011; Rydgren, 2007) .
In a nutshell, substantial progress has been made in three respects. First, scholars have diverted their attention away from trivializing definitional debates about what right-wing radicalism or populism really 'is'. Instead, they have increasingly focused on more informative discussions about theories and hypotheses. Second, scholars increasingly focus on actually measuring the ideological characteristics and policy stances of both PRR and mainstream parties (Eger and Valdez, 2015; Immerzeel et al., 2016; Pauwels, 2011a; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011) . As a corollary, most scholars have abandoned reasoning in clear-cut categories. A strict 'either-or' logic (Mudde, 2007; Van Kessel, 2015) has been replaced by the argument that populism is more a 'matter of degree' (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013; Pauwels, 2011a) . Likewise, parties can position themselves somewhere on the left-right or cosmopolitan-nativist dimension (Akkerman and Rooduijn, 2015; Van Spanje, 2011a) . Nevertheless, for many research questions requiring case selection it is still necessary to delineate which ones deserve the label PRR and which ones not.
Explanations for failures and successes: demand-and supply-side approaches
Explanations for the rise and fortunes of PRR parties and movements are usually grouped into two approaches: one focusing on grievances and one on political constraints and opportunities. This corresponds with the distinction between demand-side and supply-side factors (Klandermans, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007; Van der Brug et al., 2005) . Supply-side factors can be divided into internal factors (De Lange and Art, 2011; Norris, 2005) , like organizational characteristics (Art, 2011; De Witte and Klandermans, 2000; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000) and external factors, such as institutional frameworks and elite responses (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) . External implies that they cannot be controlled by PRR actors themselves (Goodwin, 2006) . These two sets of explanations should be viewed as complementary, rather than competing theories (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007) . Demand-side explanations are important to understand why the PRR emerged in the first place.
This review focuses on supply-side factors. We will ignore demand-side accounts, because the sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes of radical right supporters have already been extensively investigated and reviewed (Arzheimer, 2012; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Mudde, 2010; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007) . The findings can be summarized into two general claims. First, protest is not 'unideological', but clearly directed against policies concerning immigration, integration and law and order (Eatwell, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2001 ). Alternatively, now and then, supporters of PRR groups are somewhat vaguely characterized as irrational and alienated, seemingly unconnected to any particular values, policy preferences or ideology. However, this claim is empirically untenable. Voting for PRR parties is largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties (Van der Brug et al., 2000; Zhirkov, 2014) . In a similar vein, Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 267) conclude that radical right activists are socially integrated and appear as 'perfectly normal people' (cf. Blee and Creasap, 2010: 271) .
Second, it has become clear that a complete and satisfying explanation for PRR popularity and presence in the political system needs to go beyond the demand-side model. It fails to explain short-term fluctuations within countries or large differences between otherwise mostly similar countries (Coffé, 2005) . Reviewing social structure and demand explanations, Norris (2005: 14) states that 'their failure to provide an overall explanation is clear from even a simple glance at the clear contrasts in radicalright fortunes found between neighbouring states which appear to share similar cultural values, postindustrial service-sector economies, and comparable institutions of representative democracy'. For example, Austria, where the FPÖ has enjoyed considerable electoral successes, is hardly more deprived than Germany, where the PRR is weak. Similarly, comparing the divergent fortunes of the Walloon Front National and Flemish VB, it is hard to imagine that immigration and unemployment have created significantly larger electoral demands for the radical right in Flanders compared to the Walloon region (Arzheimer, 2012) .
The external supply-side: political constraints and opportunities
According to external supply-side explanations, successful mobilization is first and foremost the result of constraints and opportunities that the political and institutional context offers. Examples of such external characteristics are the electoral system, the 'political space' (or 'ideological room') left open by political competitors, responses from established/mainstream parties (i.e. any party that is not considered as part of the PRR) or splits among the political elite, most notably on the issue of the multicultural society. Several researchers have convincingly shown that such factors matter, both for the action repertoire that PRR actors adopt (Caiani and Borri, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2005) and their electoral performances (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Carter, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005) .
Institutional framework
Political-institutional variables generally show not much variation. These deeply embedded or fixed opportunities are obviously most useful for comparing different national settings, explaining country differences in PRR success. Scholarship that traces the impact of the institutional framework include works that assess whether the level of federalism and the electoral system affect the popularity of the PRR (Carter, 2002; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007; Swank and Betz, 2003; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005) . According to Kitschelt (2007 Kitschelt ( : 1193 , a review of institutional accounts of PRR party strength is 'a frustrating business'. He notes that 'although there are plenty of studies that test for institutional effects, they tend to be theoretically misspecified and empirically not capturing the configuration of institutional rules that should make a difference for electoral support of such parties'. Moreover, in short, the general lesson is that the impact is modest.
Several studies have indicated that more proportional electoral systems are conducive to the entrance or success of new parties (Tavits, 2006) , but findings regarding radical parties in particular have been mixed (Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005) . Electoral thresholds may induce potential radical right voters to support mainstream parties when they perceive their favourite party to be too weak to overcome the barrier to entry (Givens, 2005) . Clearly, the institutional configuration most unfavourable for newcomers exists in Britain (Kitschelt, 2007) . That the British radical right has 'failed' is often attributed to the majoritarian electoral system as primary reason (John and Margetts, 2009) .
Political space
In addition to the institutional framework, the emergence and rise of the PRR is affected by the positioning of the political parties within the policy space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) . Political space refers to the degree to which mainstream parties (or moderate-right parties in particular) already occupy the electoral terrain of the populist right. For that matter, the positions of the established parties shape the electoral fortunes of any 'niche' party (Meguid, 2005) . When they ideologically converge, they leave a 'gap' in the electoral market, which can potentially be exploited by challengers. Kriesi et al. (2006 Kriesi et al. ( , 2012 argue that where established parties follow a moderate course in favour of the 'winners' of globalization, they provide an opportunity for the creation of parties that mobilize the 'losers'. Several studies indeed found that ideological convergence between mainstream parties benefited the entrance or success of radical new parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Carter, 2005; Norris, 2005 ; but see Veugelers and Magnan, 2005) .
We need to distinguish issue positions from issue salience. Therefore, mainstream parties have three strategies at their disposal: remain silent on the particular issue (dismissive), distance itself from populist anti-immigrant viewpoints (adversarial), or adopt a similar position (accommodative). Meguid (2008) argues that issue salience will only enhance PRR support when mainstream parties declare hostility toward the niche party's policy position. If mainstream parties employ accommodative tactics, electoral support for PRR contenders will diminish. Many scholars similarly argue that the PRR loses out when mainstream parties adopt restrictive positions on immigration (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) . This strategy may however backfire (Bale, 2003) . Eatwell (2000: 423) for instance observed that mainstream parties 'play with fire' when they adopt anti-immigrant themes because it legitimizes the agenda of the PRR.
Political space is measured in different ways, for different time periods. Partly due to this variation, the results of studies on the effect of the political agenda of other parties on the popularity of PRR challengers show a mixed picture. For instance, using Eurobarometer surveys and party statements on internationalism, multiculturalism, national lifestyle and law and order from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), Arzheimer (2009; cf. Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) found that the ideological position of the established major moderate-right party (labelled 'toughness') had no significant effect on cross-national differences in the amount of support for the PRR. On the other hand, saliency, the relative amount of these statements in the manifestos of all established parties (ignoring the direction of the statements), had a positive impact on levels of PRR support.
In contrast, Van der Brug et al. (2005) found that PRR parties are more successful when the moderateright occupies a more centrist position on a general left-right scale (it is unclear what a position on this scale exactly signifies). They relied on the European Elections Studies data (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) and use respondents' perceptions to measure party positions. And in this case, the extent to which the anti-immigration parties' mainstream competitor emphasized the core issue of the radical right was not significant, although they measured saliency similarly as Arzheimer (using the CMP data) by selecting the issues crime, negative references to multiculturalism and positive references to 'the national way of life'.
The role of the media environment
The above-mentioned contradiction could perhaps be solved when we complement the political space approach with the notion that opportunities and constraints need to become visible through public statements in order to become relevant (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004) . Political contention increasingly consists of a battle over attention and approval in the public debate (Castells, 1997) . Populist movements rely heavily on the media, and the controversial, tabloid-style language of its leaders flourishes well in a 'media logic' in which newsworthiness is increasingly based on conflicts and scandals (Aalberg et al., 2016) .
The role of the public debate corresponds better with an externalist 'opportunity' view than with an internalist approach because gaining access to the mass media is largely beyond the control of PRR challengers themselves -gatekeepers and established political actors let them appear on stage. For smaller or marginal parties, the media are arguably more important than for established major parties, because they often lack sufficient organizational and financial means to get their message across to potential adherents. Like social movements, they need the media far more than that the media need them (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993) .
There are many indications that the 'media factor' shapes the fortunes of PRR groups. For example, the French FN made its electoral breakthrough in 1984 only after Jean-Marie Le Pen was given access to state television (Eatwell, 2005) . His popularity increased remarkably after he appeared on a popular talk show called The Hour of Truth: voter intentions for FN doubled from 3.5% to 7% (Ellinas, 2009; Ignazi, 2003) . Another example is the 'pro-Haider line' (i.e. favourable coverage for the FPÖ) of the Kronen Zeitung, Austria's largest newspaper, between 1986 and 2000 (Art, 2007) .
Media-related independent variables can be grouped into (1) media attention for issues associated with the PRR and (2) attention for PRR actors. Regarding the first, the empirical findings are inconclusive. On the one hand, news coverage on the issues of immigration and integration, and law and order enhances the electoral attractiveness of PRR parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Plasser and Ulram, 2003; Walgrave and De Swert, 2004) . This finding confirms the agenda-setting hypothesis, which holds that issues that appear frequently in the news tend to become the issues that voters deem important. Combined with the idea that the electorate will support the most credible proponent of a particular issue, it follows that media publicity for issues that are 'owned' by anti-immigration parties enhances their electoral attractiveness (Muis, 2015) .
Several researchers have also investigated the effect of news coverage on PRR actors (Lubbers, 2001; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Muis, 2015; Vliegenthart et al., 2012) . Scholars have differentiated between coverage for populist right speakers and for responses of other actors, between positive and negative coverage (Bos et al., 2010; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; Muis, 2015) , and between the visibility of leaders and parties (Vliegenthart et al., 2012) . Stewart et al. (2003: 236) argue that any media coverage gives advantage to political figures since 'it enhances their visibility and furthers their goals, by producing some kind of public legitimation'. Research has shown that PRR leaders have clearly profited from media prominence, like Pim Fortuyn (Koopmans and Muis, 2009 ) and Geert Wilders (Bos et al., 2010) . Vliegenthart et al. (2012) find that party visibility enhanced electoral support for five of the six anti-immigrant parties they investigated, namely VB, Party for Freedom (PVV), Republikaner, National Democratic Party for Germany (NPD) and German People's Union (DVU). The Dutch Centre Democrats (CD) was the one exception.
Muis's (2015) study on the CD showed two opposite effects: negative publicity was electorally harmful, but at the same time increased media visibility. The party did not increase its popularity when it achieved media access because the outright racist claims of its leader Hans Janmaat provoked harsh criticism. But when trying to attract as much attention as possible and gaining an influential voice in the debate, 'any publicity is good publicity'. Apparently, both news on support and on criticism gives actors newsworthiness and greater opportunities to put their own viewpoints in the spotlight.
The difficulty is thus to find the right balance between enhancing newsworthiness and electoral credibility. Populist leaders face a trade-off between 'being somewhat unusual and provocative ... (in order to guarantee newsworthiness and therefore prominence)' and being 'taken seriously as a party' (Bos et al., 2010: 143) .
To conclude, media effects are conditional on which stance is promoted. Future studies could be enriched by devoting more attention to adaptation and 'upward dynamics'. For instance, Clarke et al. (2016) argue that an escalation of volatility in the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) increased publicity for the party, which in turn prompted further electoral growth. Media visibility and attracting additional adherents seem to reinforce each other (Koopmans and Muis, 2009 ; but see Van der Pas et al., 2013) .
Repression, cordon sanitaire
This brings us to the role of repression and legal measures, such as bans and prosecutions. A similar logic applies here: the effect of repression is conditional. Its effects may depend on the politician or group targeted and the situation they are in. Another relevant factors is the nature of the statements in question (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015) . For instance, the hate-speech charges pressed on Geert Wilders in 2009 considerably boosted electoral support for his party (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2015) . Wilders had already established himself as a powerful politician by the time it was decided that he was to stand trial. He had already obtained much legitimacy and media visibility and his party already held nine seats in the national parliament.
The impact of prosecution is very different for politicians and groups on the fringe. When movement activists are faced with legal and social sanctions (e.g. public disapproval and exclusion), protesting is a costly business and the ability to attract a wider support-base is undermined.
Countries also differ significantly in laws regulating the Internet, and thus how favourable a national context is for the online activities of radical rightwing groups (Caiani and Parenti, 2013) . In addition to legal measures, PRR parties sometimes suffer political exclusion in the form of a refusal by other parties to cooperate with them (a so-called cordon sanitaire) (Akkerman et al., 2016) . It is however not clear whether it is an effective strategy if the purpose is to undermine electoral support. Results on the effects of exclusion on electoral outcomes of PRR parties are mixed (Pauwels, 2011b; Van Spanje and Van der Brug, 2009 ). We will return to the exclusion-radicalization thesis, which holds that excluded parties will radicalize their ideological stances (Akkerman et al., 2016) .
Internal supply-side factors: characteristics of the PRR
From an internal supply-side perspective, PRR parties and movements are largely 'masters of their own success' (Carter, 2005; Goodwin, 2006; Mudde, 2007) . We cannot reduce them to the passive consequences of socio-economic processes and external political conditions, but should treat them as shapers of their own fates. A successful PRR party employs strategic flexibility in order to exploit whatever favourable circumstances arise (Ignazi, 2003) . We can distinguish two factors: ideology and organizational structure, including leadership (Carter, 2005; Goodwin, 2006) .
The role of ideology
What parties most importantly can achieve through their own actions is to find a beneficial position in the policy space. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) claimed that the ideological 'winning formula' combines culturally exclusionist/authoritarian positions with liberal pro-market positions on socio-economic policies. However, the position that is said to make the PRR successful has changed over time (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2004) . The PRR has abandoned right-wing economic stances (Eger and Valdez, 2015) and adopted protectionism (Rydgren, 2013) and 'welfare chauvinism', the view that social benefits should be restricted to natives (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; Oesch, 2008; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016) .
Most PRR groups are comparable because they share the nativist stance as their unique selling point. However, at the same time they are distinct in their ideological character and framing, and these differences have crucial consequences in terms of the parties' fortunes. The 'master frame' (combining nativism with populism) needs to be modified to the particular national political and cultural context in which these groups operate (Caiani and Della Porta, 2011; Rydgren, 2005b) .
Carter (2005), who included not only PRR, but also non-democratic parties, demonstrated a relation between the type of ideology parties employ and their success: more extreme parties are less successful. She encountered some notable exceptions. The Dutch CD was for instance a deviant case: most of the party's ideological counterparts have flourished, like in Austria (FPÖ), France (FN) and Belgium (VB). The ideological character does not only have direct effects on the fortunes of parties, it also interacts with other explanatory factors. Golder (2003) found that increasing unemployment and high levels of immigration only yield more electoral success for the group of radical right parties he labelled 'populist', but not for the ones that were labelled as 'neofascist'. Despite these two examples, to date, research that elaborates the internal supply-side notion that one's ideological stance crucially matters, and systematically tests effects of PRR parties' platforms is relatively scarce (for another exception see Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) ; the focus on opportunities and demand-side factors has clearly prevailed. Instead of figuring as an explanatory factor, party ideology has played a more dominant role in delimiting the dependent variable.
The studies of Carter (2005) and Golder (2003) cited above illustrate a remarkable weakness that has hampered a fruitful elaboration of explanations based on ideological positioning: Carter considers the CD as similar in ideological outlook to, for instance, the FPÖ, FN and VB, based on an extensive typology that (in theory) distinguishes no fewer than 16 mutually exclusive sub-types within the family of the radical right; in contrast, according to a straightforward dichotomy outlined by Golder, the CD is different from these three other radical right parties.
Future work in this field could make progress in several ways. First, it could benefit from studies on the political space provided by the mainstream parties, which has led to much more fruitful research and findings (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005; Meguid, 2005; Norris, 2005) . As we discussed earlier, in contrast to party-centric explanations, the ideological niche available on the electoral market is usually measured with continuous variables.
Second, more sophisticated behavioural models of party strategies are useful (Kitschelt, 2007) . In order to explain success, we should not only try to identify a certain policy package that 'works' beneficially. In addition, we need to establish a deeper explanation by providing the mechanism by which parties are able or inclined to arrive at successful positions over time. Only a few accounts of far-right populism clearly explicate why or how successful populist leaders were able to find a 'successful position' and why most other attempts of politicians failed to do so (Muis and Scholte, 2013) .
Organizational arguments and leadership
Besides ideology, organizational characteristics such as a lack of financial resources, appealing leadership and shortfall of active membership have frequently been proposed as pivotal factors for the success or failure of PRR parties and movements (Art, 2011) .
Lack of coherence of party organizations and intraparty conflicts have often hampered PRR parties (Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016) .
However, organization characteristics that are supposedly beneficial or indispensable often do not seem to be relevant in order to account for the impressive performance of populist challengers. As pointed out earlier, many leaders rely almost entirely on media attention, and successful trajectories often illustrate how media visibility can compensate for organizational weaknesses (Ellinas, 2009; Mazzoleni, 2008) . The growth of active membership and the building and improvement of an organization often lag behind success, instead of the other way around: media attention and electoral support are first successfully mobilized, then organizational and financial resources follow. In a review article on party organization effects, Ellinas (2009: 219) states that organizational arguments 'would need to carefully trace the evolution of party organisations to establish the direction of causality'. His evidence from the French FN indicates that organizational growth seems to be rather the consequence than the cause of electoral party success, especially during the earlier stages of development. In a similar vein, De Witte and Klandermans (2000) identified a 'circle of organisational weakness': weak organizations (like the Dutch CD) remained weak, whereas, in contrast, strong organizations (like the Flemish Bloc in Belgium) became stronger over time. In sum, organizational resources seem often both a cause and a result of success. As a genuinely 'independent variable', organizational strength might be more important to explain the persistence of parties after their initial breakthrough (Ellinas, 2007 (Ellinas, , 2009 .
De Witte and Klandermans (2000) argued that charismatic leaders who are able to maintain peace in an organization can instigate an upward spiral of organizational strength (cf. Klandermans and Mayer, 2006) . Charismatic leadership is indeed a prominent supply-side explanation in the academic literature (Deiwiks, 2009; Eatwell, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002) .
However, the charisma explanation suffers from the tendency of circular reasoning (Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007; Van der Brug et al., 2005) . Charisma is a legitimization for those who appear to be the 'heroes of a war' and can just as suddenly vanish as it appears. If a leader is unsuccessful, or if the leadership fails to benefit the followers, charismatic authority can quickly disappear. Max Weber (1947 Weber ( [1921 ) illustrates this by noting that even Chinese monarchs could sometimes lose their status as 'sons of heaven' because of misfortune, such as defeat in war, floods or drought. To conclude, outstanding charismatic appeal is thus better seen as an emergent situational characteristic, rather than attributed to the skills and personality of the leader concerned.
Consequences of PRR party and movement success
In addition to the causes of PRR fortunes, more recently, scholars have increasingly formulated and tested hypotheses on the consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and movements (Mudde, 2013; Rosanvallon, 2008) . Some scholars have claimed that the PRR constitutes a serious threat to democracy because it emphasizes a homogeneous voice -the 'voice of the people' -and threatens the rights and protection of minority groups (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2007) .
Others have noted that PRR parties, or populist and Eurosceptic parties more generally, actually correct democratic deficiencies by speaking to a large group of citizens disillusioned with mainstream politicians (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Usherwood and Startin, 2013) . Citizens feel that there is someone who has 'listened to their grievances' (Ivarsflaten, 2008) and enables them to become passionately, rather than rationally, involved in politics (Mouffe, 2005) .
Although the debate about whether the PRR constitutes a threat or corrective to democracy is often a normative one, the question of whether there is a relationship between PRR successes and various outcomes associated with the quality of democracy (such as voter turnout) can be empirically tested (Immerzeel, 2015) . Therefore, and related to the observation that the PRR has assumed more stable positions within the party and electoral system Zaslove, 2008) , the last decade has witnessed a steady rise in scholars studying the impact of PRR success on several domains, including the party system (Mudde, 2014) and media debate (Rooduijn, 2014) . We restrict ourselves here to the literature on the impact on policies, on PRR groups themselves and on the public.
Policies and mainstream par ty positions
Given the PRR's alleged threatening effect on the position and rights of immigrants, it comes as no surprise that scholars paid attention to the extent to which the PRR was successful in implementing policies derived from its nativist, anti-immigration ideology. Scholars have investigated whether governments that included members of the PRR introduced tougher policies on immigration and integration (Akkerman, 2012; Heinisch, 2003; Luther, 2011; Zaslove, 2004) . These studies generally find no or a limited impact of the PRR on the policies implemented. For instance, Akkerman (2012) concludes on the basis of a quantitative analysis comparing the immigration and integration output of 27 cabinets of varying composition in nine countries (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) that when the PRR is in office, cabinets generally introduce stricter immigration and integration legislation than centre (-left) cabinets. Yet, centre-right cabinets that do not include a PRR do not differ in terms of strictness of immigration policy from those including a PRR. She notes that the difficulties these parties face in adapting to public office seriously hinder their effectiveness to implement stricter policies (Akkerman, 2012; cf. Van Spanje, 2011b) . The finding of Zaslove (2008) that the Austrian Freedom Party and Italian Lega Nord (LN) have been instrumental in passing more restrictive immigration policy may thus be more due to the performance of the conservative mainstream parties that cooperate with them than because of the performance of the PRR itself (cf. Heinisch, 2003) .
Although little evidence is thus found for a direct impact of the PRR on policy outcome, the PRR could influence policy making indirectly, via its impact on other parties' positions (Schain, 2006) . As such, scholars have investigated whether the PRR's success influences the policy positions on immigration, multiculturalism, populism, law and order, and more style-related issues, such as anti-establishment rhetoric (Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; Han, 2014; Immerzeel et al., 2016; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Van Spanje, 2010; Williams, 2006) . The argument is simple and revolves around electoral returns. As for instance Yılmaz (2012: 376) claims, 'the mainstream right [has] cynically adopted the cultural focus on immigration in part to recapture the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim animosity that brought the populist farright electoral gains'. A similar vote-seeking logic explains why the mainstream left is paralysed: 'rather than articulating their own vision for the future of the nation (or Europe), they have quietly accepted the basic premise of the Islamophobic/xenophobic perspective in order to keep their constituency from being attracted to the extreme right'. What about the empirical proof for such claims?
To study these effects of the PRR, scholars used either expert surveys, where colleagues are asked to rate all political parties in a country on typical issues (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2010; Immerzeel et al., 2011; Van Spanje, 2010) , or the salience of typical PRR issues in the party programmes summarized in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (e.g. Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012; Hooghe et al., 2010) . Akkerman (2015) used a more fine-grained manifesto content analysis , since the CMP data lack sufficient detail on immigration and integration issues.
The results of these studies can be easily summarized: the PRR affects the stances of mainstream parties on immigration and integration issues, but not on other issues. Based on various expert surveys, Van Spanje (2010) concluded that, in general, all other political parties have become more restrictive with respect to immigration and integration due to the PRR's success. Using manifesto data, Han (2014) and Akkerman (2015) found similar effects. More specifically, Akkerman (2015) finds that it was mainly Liberals who were tempted to co-opt far-right positions while Social Democrats are not affected at all -or at least their reaction is far from uniform (Bale et al., 2010 ) -and Han (2014 shows that leftwing parties only become less multicultural 'when the opinion of party supporters on foreigners becomes more negative or when the parties lost more votes in the previous election than their opponent right-wing mainstream parties did' (Han, 2014: 1) .
With regard to other issues, such as populism and law and order, mainstream parties seem to hold to their original ideological position (Bale et al., 2010) . On the basis of manifesto data and expert surveys (Immerzeel et al., 2016) , scholars do not find that mainstream parties have become more populist and authoritarian.
Hence, there is evidence that the PRRs have an indirect, but modest influence on policy outcomes. This impact of the PRR on policy positions is generally limited to the issue of immigration and integration (Mudde, 2013) . Specifically mainstream right-wing parties employ a convergence strategy that puts them ideologically closer to the PRR (Meguid, 2005; Williams, 2006) . However, mainstream right parties are often inclined to move toward stricter immigration policy anyway, independently of PRR successes (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012; Bale, 2003) . This conclusion also emerges from case studies, such as the UK (Bale, 2013) , France (Godin, 2013) and the Netherlands (Van Heerden et al., 2014) .
Consequence for PRR par ties/movements
There is also a growing scholarship on how successes of the PRR affect these groups themselves. Most importantly, what effect does the inclusion into a governing coalition have on parties, both in terms of their ideological positions and their electoral success Akkerman and Rooduijn, 2015; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; Van Spanje, 2011b )? Heinisch (2003 argued that because of their ideology, right-wing populist parties thrive in opposition, but have trouble with actually participating in a government. He claims that governing leads to more moderate positions and hence to electoral losses. However, there is no consensus regarding the effect of taking up government responsibility on the ideological positions and electoral success of the PRR. Although there are several case studies, systematic tests of the so-called inclusion-moderation thesis are scarce (Akkerman et al., 2016) . Observers have generalized too much from just two prominent cases of failures, the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the Austrian FPÖ (Mudde, 2013) . McDonnell (2010, 2015) dismiss the received wisdom that populist parties have inherent problems with assuming power. Their case studies of three populist parties in Italy and Switzerland -Popolo della Libertà (PDL), LN and Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) -show that PRR parties can thrive and hold on to their radical positions when they take up government responsibility (cf. Frölich-Steffen and Rensmann, 2007) . Likewise, Mudde (2013: 15) disagrees with 'the dominant strain in the populism literature that argues that populist parties are destined for success in opposition and failure in government'. PRR can parties can keep 'one foot in and one foot out' of government (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005) . They will uphold their oppositional image, by using radical rhetoric and pushing for radical policies, rather than run the risk of being perceived as a 'normal' governmental party and part of 'the corrupt elite'. Based on manifesto coding, Akkerman and Rooduijn (2015) found that none of the 'nonostracized' parties in their study -the Swiss SVP, Austrian FPÖ and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), Italian LN, Dutch LPF and Danish People's Party (DF) -became more moderate except the Dutch PVV: its degree of radicalism strongly decreased between 2010 and 2012.
Overall, there is no indication that radical rightwing populist parties are becoming less radical and more 'mainstream' (Akkerman et al., 2016) . However, since only a limited amount of parties actually took office, it remains to be seen whether the costs of government are relatively higher for populists.
Citizens' attitudes and behaviour
Third, the PRR's emergence and success might have consequences at the individual level. Citizens could be affected in the sense that they attach more importance to certain issues, shift their views toward more anti-immigration and authoritarian positions, and change their political behaviour (Andersen and Evans, 2003; Bohman, 2011; Braun, 2011; Dunn and Singh, 2011; Immerzeel, 2015; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011; Van der Brug, 2003; Wilkes et al., 2007) . PRR groups can make some issues more salient (Bale, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2005) and trigger politically disengaged people to become actively or passionately involved in politics (Jansen, 2011; Mouffe, 2005) .
Studies on the impact of PRR success on immigration attitudes provide a mixed picture (Dunn and Singh, 2011; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011) . Some conclude that successful and highly visible PRR parties can undermine support for multiculturalism (Bohman, 2011) , whereas others find no effects of radical right representation on tolerance among European populations. An extensive recent study, based on European Social Survey data (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , showed that PRR parties have not driven anti-immigration attitudes in Europe (Bohman and Hjerm, 2016) . The main difficulty is the lack of longitudinal studies, modelling the attitudinal consequences of PRR success over time. Evidence based on German and Dutch panel data showed that perceptions of threatened group interests precipitate rather than follow citizens' preferences for PRR parties (Berning and Schlueter, 2016) .
Regarding political involvement and trust, one might expect that PRR parties foster voter turnout because they are passionate mobilizers that fulfil a watchdog function and reintroduce electoral competition (Franklin, 2004) . For instance, Fallend (2012) concludes that the Austrian FPÖ addressed issues neglected by other parties, such as immigration and integration. Accordingly, over the period 1996-2001, the party gave voice to an apolitical part of the electorate, who increasingly felt that politicians listened to them. Likewise, De showed that since 1997, political trust and satisfaction with democracy in Belgium have increased with the rise of the VB. However, based on a Dutch six-wave panel study (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , Rooduijn et al. (2016) find that the popularity of populist parties fuels political discontent, rather than dampens it (cf. Van der Brug, 2003) .
De found that in Belgium electoral turnout numbers have decreased, whereas the VB has become more popular, which seems to contradict the idea that the PRR attracts disengaged people. In the same vein, based on an analysis of 33 European countries in the period 2002 , Immerzeel and Pickup (2015 find there is no general positive influence of the PRR's popularity on electoral turnout. Yet, the Western European PRR encourages some social groups to turn out for national elections. These groups are, however, people who are actually repelled by them: the more highly educated and politically interested are more inclined to 'keep the rascals out'. To conclude, to speak of the PRR as 'corrective of democracy' is -in terms of increasing electoral turnout or increasing political satisfaction -a misunderstanding.
Another interesting question is how institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation are related. Hutter (2014) finds that the more successful the populist radical right is in electoral terms, the more it tends to abstain from protest activities. In a similar vein, access to political power in a number of Western European countries over the past years might have contributed to less right-wing violence (Ravndal, 2016) . Koopmans' (1996) crossnational comparison shows an inverse relation between the success of PRR parties and the incidence of racist violence. Hence, we can conclude that the electoral channel effectively substitutes for street activity and violence (cf. Braun and Koopmans, 2010) .
The action repertoire of the PRR thus depends on the political space made available by mainstream parties for far-right mobilization . Most European countries have strong PRR parties. But particularly in the United Kingdom and Germany, xenophobic sentiments can hardly be canalized through the electoral channel. It therefore should perhaps not come as a surprise that both countries have experiences with large-scale street movements. Several scholars have interpreted the rise of the English Defence League (EDL) and Britain First as corollary of the decay of the British National Party (BNP) (Alessio and Meredith, 2014; Allen, 2014) . The EDL 'offered a more attractive and confrontational alternative to perennial failure at the ballot box' (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 8) . The movement hereby relied heavily on social media to get its message across and recruit supporters (Busher, 2013) .
In sum, a weak or fragmented party sector corresponds with a strong movement sector or environment of violence (Minkenberg, 2011) . It remains to be seen whether UKIP (in the UK) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) will change this picture in the future. Patzelt and Klose (2016) conclude that the number of Pegida protesters has shrunk since the AfD has increasingly succeeded to put their grievances on the political agenda. Although several AfD politicians have distanced themselves from Pegida (Geiges et al., 2015) , a survey showed that 57% of the Pegida demonstrators in Dresden would vote for AfD, and only about 4-5% for NPD (Reuband, 2015) .
Future directions: how to proceed?
We conclude this review with a discussion of possible avenues for future research. Although the scholarship on this topic has become a 'minor industry' (Arzheimer, 2012: 35) , there are important gaps and opportunities. Concerning research questions, scholars need to pay more attention to the temporal dimension of political contention. Since Minkenberg (2000: 170) observed that 'serious comparative scholarship on the radical right is still in its infancy', cross-national comparisons have become commonplace. Remarkably, however, comparisons in time are still scarce (Ellinas, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007) . A dynamic view would address the argument that explanations for and consequences of PRR parties and movements may change during their trajectory.
For instance, before groups pass the 'threshold of relevance' (Carter, 2005; Ellinas, 2007) -i.e . are big enough to matter -organizational attributes might have no effect on their performance. And once populist outsiders have established themselves as strong and credible alternatives, traditional parties may not win back electoral support if they adopt similar agendas (Van Kessel, 2015) . Likewise, the impact of taking up government responsibility depends on how long parties exist and whether they have institutionalized (De Lange and Art, 2011) .
Cross-national comparisons have focused mainly on the PRR's electoral strength. The strength of social movements and the interplay between movements and parties have received relatively little attention. Except for Germany, there are few systematic comparative studies of the non-party sector of the PRR (Hutter, 2014; Minkenberg, 2005 Minkenberg, , 2011 . Individual-level research is needed on the question whether the electoral channel effectively substitutes for street activity, not only on the macro level (Hutter, 2014; Koopmans, 1996) . To what extent do people refrain from using non-parliamentary means to voice their grievances about multiculturalism and immigration, due to electoral successes and/or government inclusion of PRR parties? Do extremist activists perceive voting as a credible alternative option? Minkenberg (2011) points out that supporters of PRR parties do not usually overlap with perpetrators of racist violence. Again, a dynamic perspective is important: over time, movements can turn into political parties, and parties can engage in street demonstrations when they face political obstruction.
This brings us to future avenues for theoretical progress. Both PRR actors and its competitors/opponents can adjust their action repertoire and ideology over time, which is insufficiently addressed by static, spatial comparisons. Future scholarship could theorize more about two key components that stem from such an evolutionary perspective on parties and movements: feedback and learning. Actors continually adapt to what has gone before and respond to what other agents are doing. These ingredients make political contention a so-called 'complex adaptive system' (Laver and Sergenti, 2012) . A fruitful tool to map out dynamic interactions of adaptive individuals is agent-based modelling, but applications in the PRR literature are scarce.
In terms of confronting theories with empirical evidence, future studies could be enriched by greater attention to PRR parties and movements' presence on the Internet. The current debate on the role of the Internet is characterized by much theoretical speculation; we know little about how these groups use the Internet for political communication and mobilization (Caiani and Parenti, 2013) . To date, to assess where PRR groups stand, scholars often rely on manifestos (Akkerman et al., 2016; Eger and Valdez, 2015) , expert surveys (Immerzeel et al., 2016) and traditional media outlets (Bos and Brants, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2008) .
Few citizens actually read party manifestos. Most people perceive politics by what they read in the media instead (Kriesi et al., 2008) . Obviously, using mass media also has a significant drawback, since coverage might be biased (Helbling and Tresch, 2011) . These caveats could be overcome by relying on sources that are widely consumed by citizens and controlled by PRR parties and movements themselves, such as Facebook pages (Arzheimer, 2015a) or tweets (Van Kessel and Castelein, 2016) .
Social media material could also enrich our understanding of supporters and sympathizers, in addition to surveys or interviews. For instance, Arzheimer (2015a Arzheimer ( , 2015b concludes that the German AfD does not qualify as either nativist or populist, but statements of Facebook fans hint at more radical currents among supporters and rankand-file members. The topics that people devote most attention to (Islam and immigration) are hardly mentioned in AfD's own posts.
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